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A rapidly growing empirical literature is studying the causes and consequences of bank 
fragility in contemporary economies. The paper reviews the two basic methodologies adopted 
in cross-country empirical studies, the signals approach and the multivariate probability 
model, and their application to study the determinants of banking crises. The use of these 
models to provide early warnings for crises is also reviewed, as are studies of the economic 
effects of banking crises and of the policies to forestall them. The paper concludes by 
identifying directions for future research.  
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Until recently, research on banking crises was inspired mostly by the experiences of the 19th 
and early 20th century. In particular, the field was dominated by studies of the Great 
Depression, when numerous and catastrophic bank failures occurred around the world.
1 
Beginning in the 1990s, a resurgence of banking crises provided new impetus and new 
materials to researchers, and a rapidly growing literature is studying the causes and 
consequences of bank fragility in contemporary economies. This paper surveys this work and 
tries to highlight directions for future research. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the basic facts about the 
recent wave of financial crises. Section 3 presents the two basic methodologies adopted in 
cross-country empirical studies of the determinants of banking crises, and Section 4 discusses 
how these models have been used for crisis prediction.  Section 5 reviews the literature and 
evidence on how various factors contribute to bank fragility. Section 6 surveys work on the 
economic effects of banking crises. Section 7 concludes by pointing to some of the issues 
that further research could usefully focus on.  
 
2.  The resurgence of financial instability in the 1990s 
Following the financial disasters of the 1920s and ’30s, the postwar years marked a return to 
economic and financial stability, and banking crises were rare and isolated events. A calm 
macroeconomic environment, favourable economic growth, low inflation, and pervasive 
controls on international capital flows contributed to financial stability. Also, in many 
countries, including the more free-market oriented ones, bankers’ freedom of action 
remained severely restricted by watchful central banks, wielding a wide array of regulatory 
powers to control the quantity and price of credit.  
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Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the first oil shock, 
macroeconomic stability became elusive. But even during the turbulent 1970s the banking 
sector remained sound in most countries, perhaps thanks to the low (indeed negative) real 
interest rates and the persistent regulatory straightjacket.  
Once lax monetary policy was abandoned, real interest skyrocketed, and credit 
markets began to be liberalised in the early 1980s, several financial crises broke out in Latin 
America and other developing countries, often accompanied by widespread bank distress. 
Most explanations for these crises, however, focused on fiscal profligacy, external shocks, 
and exchange rate policy as the main culprits, while bank fragility continued to garner little 
attention. An important exception was Diaz-Alejandro’s (1985) masterful account of the 
Chilean crisis. As the title unambiguously indicates (Goodbye financial repression, hello 
financial crash), this paper traced the roots of the Chilean crisis directly to the banking 
system and its botched privatisation in the late 1970s. 
If bankers might have been innocent by-standers during the LDC debt crises of the 
1980s, this was certainly not the case in the US Savings and Loans debacle which unfolded 
during the same period. This episode demonstrated how the erosion of bank capital following 
financial liberalisation, generous deposit insurance, and ineffective regulation could conspire 
to make gambling and looting an optimal business strategy for scores of bank managers 
(Kane, 1989; Akerlof and Romer, 1993). Though US tax-payers eventually shouldered a 
large fiscal cost, the macroeconomic effects of the S&L episode were negligible. 
With the arrival of the 1990s, financial crises in which the banking sector played 
centre stage and macroeconomic consequences were sharp and – at times – protracted, 
became more and more widespread. In the Scandinavian countries currency devaluation and 
falling asset prices caused banking crises and economic slowdown (Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 
1998). In Japan the collapse of the asset price bubble rendered most of the banking sector   4
insolvent, though open bank failures remained rare. Regulatory forbearance and lax monetary 
policy allowed the process of balance sheet repair to stretch over more than a decade, and 
banks continued to finance poorly performing firms (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004). After over 
40 years of rapid expansion, Japanese growth ground to a halt in 1992, and has yet to 
recover.  
The crisis that perhaps contributed the most to put bank health squarely on the list of 
the key components of macroeconomic stability was the Tequila crisis, which began in 
Mexico in December 1994. In contrast to the earlier Latin American experiences, before the 
crisis the Mexican Government finances appeared mostly sound. Nonetheless, the 
combination of a faltering banking system, dollar-denominated debt, and political shocks 
resulted in the devaluation of the currency and financial meltdown (see, for instance, Calvo, 
1996, and Edwards and Végh, 1997). Eventually, the cost of bailing out the banks reached 
almost 20 per cent of GDP; despite the generous rescue, bank credit to the private sector and 
economic growth in Mexico remain lacklustre to this day.  
If the Tequila episode had left any observer in doubt about the dangers of bank 
fragility, the East Asian crises of 1997–8 drove the point home; even economies with sound 
public finances and a spectacular growth record could be brought to their knees within a few 
months, as banks buckled, depositors lost confidence, asset prices collapsed, and foreign 
capital inflows evaporated (see, for instance, Lindgren et al., 1999).  
The banking crises of the 1990s spurred numerous case studies, some descriptive and 
some econometric, of specific banking crisis episodes, as well as several attempts to draw 
generalisations from individual experiences.
2
 They also stimulated more systematic efforts to 
assess bank fragility around the world.  In 1996 the IMF and the World Bank published 
comprehensive studies of bank distress in their member countries (Lindgren, Garcia, and 
Saal, 1996 and Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996). This led to the remarkable discovery that a full   5
three-quarters of the membership had experienced significant banking problems during 
1980–96. These studies showed that the extent and nature of the problems varied 
substantially, including cases of insolvency of one or two large banks and situations in which 
loss-making government-owned institutions needed chronic recapitalisation. But weaknesses 
extended to all regions of the world and levels of development. Bank fragility was pervasive 
and multifaceted, a phenomenon ripe for more systematic empirical investigation.  
The surveys provided the raw material to construct a sample, while economic theories 
and case studies suggested mechanisms and channels through which economic conditions 
and structural characteristics might impact bank stability. In the rest of the paper we will 
summarise the main methodological approaches, results, and open questions in cross-country 
studies of banking crises.  
 
3.  Two econometric approaches to identifying the determinants of banking crises   
The signals approach 
The signals approach, originally developed to identify turning points in business cycles, was 
first applied to banking crises by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). This study focuses on the 
phenomenon of the ‘twin crises’, namely the simultaneous occurrence of currency and 
banking crises. To this end, the paper documents the incidence of currency, banking, and 
twin crises in a sample of twenty industrial and emerging countries 1970–95. Currency crises 
are identified based on an index of market turbulence developed by Eichengreen et al. 
(1995), while the onset of a banking crises is assumed to coincide with depositor runs leading 
to the closure or takeover of one or more banks, or with large-scale government intervention 
to assist, take over, merge, or close one or more financial institutions, leading to more 
intervention elsewhere in the financial system.  
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Currency crises are found to be much more frequent than banking crises in the sample 
(76 episodes versus 26); of these, 19 episodes are twin crises, so a wide majority of banking 
crises is also accompanied by an exchange rate crash. However, because the sample was 
chosen to include only countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange rates for which 
currency crashes are more common, the sample selection criterion may overemphasise the 
importance of the exchange rate for banking crises.  
The second step in Kaminsky and Reinhart’s analysis is to describe the behaviour of 
fifteen macroeconomic variables in the 24 months preceding and following crises and 
compare it with the behaviour during tranquil times. Concerning banking crises, the main 
indications emerging from the data are that in the months preceding a crisis monetary growth 
and interest rates (both lending and deposit rates) are above normal, suggesting a high level 
of demand for money and credit. Among external balance indicators, export growth appears 
below trend before banking crises, and the real exchange rate is appreciating. Finally, real 
output growth falls below trend about eight months before the peak of the banking crisis, 
while stock prices peak at about the same time. This suggests that banking crises are 
preceded by a cyclical downturn. 
The third part of Kaminsky and Reinhart’s study is a more formal econometric 
investigation of the factors associated with the onset of crises using the signals approach. 
According to this methodology, the behaviour of each relevant variable during the 24 months 
prior to a crisis is contrasted with the behaviour during ‘tranquil’ times. A variable is deemed 
to signal a crisis any time it crosses a particular threshold. If the signal is followed by a crisis 
within the next 24 months it is considered correct; otherwise it is a false alarm. The threshold 
for each variable is chosen to minimise the in-sample noise-to-signal ratio.
3
 Finally, the 
performance of each signal is compared based on three yardsticks: the associated type I and 
type II error (probability of missing a crisis and probability of a false signal, respectively),   7
the noise-to-signal ratio, and the probability of a crisis occurring conditional on a signal 
being issued. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that for banking crises the indicator with the 
lowest noise-to-signal ratio and the highest probability of crisis conditional on the signal is 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate, followed by equity prices and the money 
multiplier. These three indicators, however, have a large incidence of type I error, as they fail 
to issue a signal in 73–79 per cent of the observations during the 24 months preceding a 
crisis. The incidence of type II error, on the other hand, is much lower, ranging between 8 
and 9 per cent. The variable with the lowest type I error is the real interest rate, which signals 
in 30 per cent of the pre-crisis observations. Another interesting finding is that indicators 
reflecting developments in the real rather than the monetary sector seem to be more closely 
associated with banking crises rather than currency crises. In addition, twin crises are 
preceded by more acute ‘warning signs’ than individual crises and have more protracted 
adverse effects.  
 
The multivariate logit approach 
With the signals approach each possible covariate is considered in isolation, and the 
econometric model does not provide a way to aggregate the information provided by each 
indicator. What should be done if one indicator signals a crisis but another does not? Another 
difficulty is that, by focusing only on whether or not the variable in question has crossed the 
crucial threshold, the methodology ignores a lot of information in the data; whether an 
indicator is barely above the threshold rather than well above it is presumably important in 
assessing fragility, but the signals method does not make use of this information.  
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An alternative methodology to study the covariates of banking crisis, which remedies 
some of these problems, is the multivariate logit approach developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998). With this approach, the probability that a crisis occurs is assumed to be a 
function of a vector of explanatory variables. A logit econometric model is fitted to the data 
and an estimate of the crisis probability is obtained by maximising the likelihood function. 
Thus, the model produces a summary measure of fragility (the estimated probability of crisis) 
which makes the best possible use of the information in the explanatory variables (subject to 
the hypothesised functional form).  
More formally, in each period the country is either experiencing a crisis or it is not. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable takes the value zero if there is no crisis and takes the 
value one if there is a crisis. The probability that a crisis will occur at a particular time in a 
particular country is hypothesised to be a function of a vector of n explanatory variables X(i, 
t). Letting P(i, t) denote the banking crisis dummy variable, denote a vector of n unknown 
coefficients, and  denote the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at , the 
log-likelihood function of the model is: 
Ln L =  Σt=1..T Σi=1..n{P(i,t)ln[F(β′X(i,t))] + (1-P(i,t)) ln[1- F(β′X(i,t))]}. 
The probability distribution F is assumed to be logistic. Thus, the estimated 
coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(1–P(i,t)). 
Therefore, the increase in the probability depends upon the original probability, and thus 
upon the initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.  
An important methodological issue is how to deal with observations following the 
onset of a banking crisis, when the behaviour of some of the explanatory variables is likely to 
be affected by the crisis itself. For instance, the real interest rate might fall due to the 
loosening of monetary policy that often accompanies banking sector rescue operations.   9
Clearly, this type of feed-back effect would muddle the relationships; to avoid this problem, 
years during which the crisis is unfolding are typically excluded from the sample.  
Another key element of our study was the construction of the banking crisis dummy 
variable. Beginning from a sample of all the countries in the world, economies in transition 
were excluded based on the view that the problems in these countries were of a special 
nature. The following step was to identify all episodes of banking sector distress, drawing 
from the surveys of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren et al. (1996) and from other 
case studies. To distinguish between fragility in general and crises in particular, and between 
localised crises and systemic crises, we established – somewhat arbitrarily – that for an 
episode of distress to be classified as a full-fledged crisis in our panel, at least one of the 
following four conditions had to hold:  the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the 
banking system exceeded 10 per cent; the cost of the rescue operation was at least 2 per cent 
of GDP; banking sector problems had led to a large scale nationalisation of banks; extensive 
bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank 
holidays, or generalised deposit guarantees were enacted by the Government in response to 
the crisis.  
Table 1 shows a version of the regressions in our 1998 paper, in which the sample has 
been extended through 2002 and to include more countries. The number of crises episodes in 
the baseline specification has risen from 31 to 77, a sizable improvement (table 2).
4
 The 
findings are by and large consistent with those of the earlier paper, indicating that the 
relationships are fairly robust.  
Low GDP growth, high real interest rates, and high inflation are significantly 
correlated with the occurrence of a banking crisis. Thus, crises tend to manifest themselves 
during periods of weak economic growth and loss of monetary control. Exposure to real 
interest rate risk is also a source of banking fragility. This is consistent with the view that   10
higher and more volatile real interest rates during the 1980s and 1990s, relative to the 
previous two decades, may have contributed to the greater incidence of banking crisis. 
Changes in the terms of trade and exchange rate depreciation are not significant. The fiscal 
variable (the budget surplus scaled by GDP) has a positive coefficient, but it is significant 
only when deposit insurance is omitted.
5
  
Among the banking sector variables, the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange 
reserves, measuring vulnerability to a run on the currency, enters positively and significantly, 
suggesting that bank exposure to currency crises plays a role in banking crises. Credit to the 
private sector enters with a positive sign, indicating that countries where the banking sector 
has a larger exposure to private sector borrowers are more vulnerable, perhaps as a result of 
mismanaged liberalisation. Also consistent with this finding, high lagged credit growth, 
which may capture a credit boom, is significantly and positively correlated with the 
probability of a crisis in all specifications.  
Concerning the institutional variables, the level of development as measured by GDP 
per capita is negatively correlated with systemic banking sector problems, indicating that 
developing countries are more vulnerable to bank fragility. In addition, the presence of an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme appears to be a risk factor, probably because the positive 
effect operating through a reduction in self-fulfilling panics is more than offset by the 
negative effect operating through moral hazard. We will return to deposit insurance in 
Section 5. 
 
4.  Using econometric models of banking crises as early warning systems
6
  
As banking crises spread in the 1990s, the need to improve monitoring capabilities of 
financial vulnerabilities at both national and international levels became acute, and the search 
for useful ‘early warnings’ of banking crises intensified. Many authors identified variables   11
displaying anomalous behaviour before a crisis. For instance, Gavin and Hausman (1995) 
and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) proposed using credit growth as a crisis indicator to 
detect credit booms. Mishkin (1996) highlighted equity price declines, while Calvo (1996) 
suggested monitoring the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, which had 
sharply increased before the Tequila crisis in Mexico. 
In one of the first systematic evaluations of alternative indicators, Honohan (1997) 
uses a sample of eighteen crisis and six non-crisis countries and divides the former into three 
groups according to the type of crisis – macroeconomic, microeconomic, or related to the 
behaviour of the Government. He then compares the average values of seven indicators for 
crisis countries with the same averages for the control group. His results show that crises due 
to government intervention are associated with high levels of borrowing and central bank 
lending to the banking system. Further, banking crises stemming from macroeconomic 
problems are associated with high loan-to-deposit ratios, high foreign borrowing-to-deposit 
ratios, and high growth rates of credit. Interestingly, crises originating from microeconomic 
pressures are not associated with abnormal behaviour in any of the indicators.  
Rojas-Suarez (1998) proposes an approach similar to the CAMEL early warning 
system used by US regulators to identify problem banks.
7
 In emerging markets, particularly 
Latin America, she recommends also monitoring a number of non-CAMEL indicators, such 
as deposit interest rates, the spread between lending and deposit rates, the growth rate of 
credit, and the growth rate of interbank lending. Because bank level indicators are compared 
to banking system averages, however, this approach is better at identifying weak banks 
within a system rather than systemic crises. Also, since the approach requires detailed bank 
level information, it is difficult to utilise for a large number of countries. 
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The signals approach introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) was later applied 
to crisis prediction and further refined in Kaminsky (1999) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000).
8
 Since the likelihood of crisis is expected to be greater when several 
indicators signal simultaneously, Kaminsky (1999) develops a composite index, constructed 
as the number of indicators that cross the threshold at any given time. Alternatively, a 
weighted variant may be used, in which each indicator is weighted by its signal-to-noise ratio 
so that more informative indicators receive more weight. The best composite indicator 
outperforms the real exchange rate in predicting crises in the sample, but it is worse at 
predicting tranquil observations.   
In Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), we show that crisis probabilities 
estimated through a multivariate logit framework result in lower in-sample type I and type II 
errors than the signals of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and can thus provide a more 
accurate basis for an early warning system. To explore how the logit model can be used to 
monitor bank fragility, we construct out-of-sample forecasts of crisis probabilities using 
coefficients estimated from the multivariate logit model and forecasts of right- hand-side 
variables drawn from professional forecasters or international institutions. 
How can these forecasted probabilities be used to make a quantitative assessment of 
fragility? We consider two frameworks. In the first, the monitor wants to know whether there 
is enough fragility to take action. The measure of fragility is the forecast probability of a 
crisis. Deciding when this probability is high enough to act involves trading-off the costs of 
taking action when there is no crisis against the costs of doing nothing when the trouble is 
real. The monitor can be thought of as choosing this threshold by minimising a loss function 
that reflects the likelihood of having to pay either type of cost, which is evaluated based on 
the in-sample probabilities of type I and type II errors. So the optimal trigger for action 
depends not only on the in-sample predictive power of the model, but also on the costs of   13
making a mistake. These costs, of course, vary across decisionmakers.  In a second 
monitoring framework, the monitor is simply interested in rating the fragility of the banking 
system. Depending on the rating, different courses of action may follow. It is desirable for 
the ratings to have a clear interpretation in terms of probability of crisis, so that they can be 
compared. Both monitoring frameworks can be used as tools to economise on precautionary 
costs by pointing to cases of high fragility that warrant more in-depth monitoring.   
Applying the monitoring frameworks to six crisis episodes (Jamaica, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) shows that, while both actual and forecasted data 
would have indicated high vulnerability in Jamaica, the picture would have been much rosier 
for the Asian countries (see table 3). Although signs of fragility were present in Thailand and 
the Philippines, the overall image for these countries was fairly reassuring, as expectations of 
continued strong economic growth and stable exchange rates offset the negative impact of 
relatively high real interest rates and strong past credit expansion.
9
  
Econometric analysis of systemic banking crises is a relatively new field, and the 
development and evaluation of monitoring and forecasting tools based on this analysis are 
also at an early stage. So far, these tools have met with only limited success, as in-sample 
prediction accuracy cannot be replicated out-of-sample, a problem common to many areas of 
economics. One explanation may be that new crises are different from those experienced in 
the past, so that the coefficients derived from in-sample estimation are of limited use out of 
sample. Another problem may be that banking crises are rare events, so in-sample estimates 
are based on relatively few data points.   
One way to improve monitoring capabilities is to develop alternative scenarios – with 
high and low forecasts for the explanatory variables – and to examine banking sector fragility 
in the context of such scenarios. Stress-testing exercises utilised in the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs by the IMF and World Bank are a step in this direction. Another   14
strategy might be to explore how movements in high-frequency variables, such as spreads on 
the interbank market or on commercial paper issued by banks, stock market valuation of 
banks, and corporate vulnerability, move before the onset of crises. Significant data 
collection efforts are needed to make this type of exercise feasible for a large sample of 
countries, however.  
 
5.  Studies of the determinants of banking crises 
Following the early studies by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998), work on the determinants of bank fragility has proceeded on several 
fronts. Most of the studies use the multivariate limited dependent model, while the signals 
approach has remained more popular in applications aimed at constructing early warning 
systems. In this section we summarise some of this work, organising the material based on 
the category of explanatory variables investigated. 
 
Individual bank measures of fragility and systemic crises 
The literature on early warnings of individual bank failure is well established, with empirical 
studies dating back to the early 1970s. This literature uses bank balance sheet and market 
information to explain and forecast the failure of individual institutions.
10
 A few studies have 
adapted this approach to study systemic banking crises. For instance, González-Hermosillo 
(1999) uses bank-specific as well as macroeconomic data to investigate episodes of banking 
distress in different regions of the US and in two countries, Mexico and Colombia. She finds 
that non-performing loans and capital asset ratios often deteriorate rapidly before bank 
failure. This study also explicitly investigates how individual bank failure can be affected by 
overall fragility in the banking sector, and finds little evidence of such contagion.    
   15
Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (1999) investigate the Asian crises by focusing mostly 
on individual institution data.  Specifically, they analyse how CAMEL variables, bank size, 
and corporate connections, as well as country dummies, explain bank failures. They find that 
CAMEL variables do reasonably well in predicting distress, that big financial institutions are 
more likely to become distressed but less likely to be closed, and that connected institutions 
are more likely to experience trouble. They conclude that while exogenous shocks played a 
role in causing the systemic crisis in Asia, there were also significant prior weaknesses at the 
individual bank level that contributed to distress. 
 
Financial liberalisation and crises   
The view that financial liberalisation may lead to greater financial fragility has been often 
articulated (Caprio and Summers, 1993; Stiglitz, 1994; see also Allen, 2005, this volume). 
Financial liberalisation gives banks greater opportunities to take on risk. With limited 
liability and implicit and explicit guarantees, when bank capital and charter value erode, 
bankers do not bear much downside risk. Unless the country has well developed institutions 
and good prudential regulation and supervision to curb risk-taking, liberalisation may 
increase fragility beyond socially desirable limits.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) find that banking crises are indeed more 
likely to occur in countries that have liberalised their financial systems, even after controlling 
for other country characteristics. This effect, however, is mitigated by a strong institutional 
environment, especially respect for the rule of law, low corruption and good contract 
enforcement. These results are consistent with the view that if liberalisation is not 
accompanied by sufficient prudential regulation and supporting institutions to ensure 
effective supervision, it is likely to result in excessive risk-taking and a subsequent crisis. 
Later empirical studies by Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999), Glick and Hutchison (2001), Arteta   16
and Eichengreen (2002), and Noy (2004) similarly find that financial liberalisation can 
significantly increase bank fragility. 
 
International shocks, exchange rate regime, and crises 
Another line of research investigates the impact of worldwide economic shocks and the 
exchange rate regime on bank fragility. A number of observers noticed the relationship 
between financial difficulties in emerging markets and tighter monetary conditions and 
growth deceleration in the industrialised world.
11
 For instance, the Volcker disinflation in the 
US in 1979–81 has been blamed for contributing to the financial crises in Latin America in 
the early 1980s. Similarly, the monetary tightening in the United States in 1994 may have 
contributed to the Mexican crisis.  
Eichengreen and Rose (1998) is the first empirical paper on the role of international 
shocks in banking crises. It finds a strong effect of OECD interest rates and, to a smaller 
extent, OECD GDP growth, on bank fragility in developing countries. Arteta and 
Eichengreen (2002) find that when the sample is extended to include more recent years, the 
evidence of an OECD effect becomes weaker. These authors conclude that the banking crises 
of the mid-1990s were different from earlier episodes, with external factors playing a much 
smaller role compared to domestic factors.   
The impact of external factors on bank fragility might vary with the exchange rate 
regime. For instance, flexible exchange rates may have a stabilising effect on the financial 
system since the exchange rate can absorb some of the real shocks to the economy (Mundell, 
1961). Flexible regimes may also curtail the tendency of countries to over-borrow in foreign 
currency and discourage banks from funding dangerous lending booms through external 
credit (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). Further, with a fixed exchange rate (and even 
more so with a currency board), lender of last resort operations are severely limited, as   17
domestic monetary expansion risks undermining confidence in the currency peg. Thus, a 
country with fixed exchange rate regime may be more prone to bank runs and financial 
panics (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Wood, 1999).   
On the other hand, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) note that a commitment to a 
currency peg may reduce the probability of banking crises by disciplining policymakers. The 
lack of an effective lender of last resort may also discourage risk-taking by bankers, 
decreasing the likelihood of a banking crisis. Finally, developing countries are often plagued 
by lack of credibility and limited access to international markets, and suffer from more 
pronounced effects of exchange rate volatility due to their high liability dollarisation. Thus, 
the additional transparency and credibility associated with fixed exchange rates may insulate 
a country from contagion (Calvo, 1999).  
Empirically, Arteta and Eichengreen (2002) find that countries with fixed and flexible 
exchange rates are equally susceptible to banking crises. In contrast, Domaç and Martinez-
Peria (2003) find that adopting a fixed exchange rate diminishes the likelihood of a banking 
crisis in developing countries. In addition, once a crisis occurs, its economic cost is larger 
under a fixed exchange rate.  
Studies on the impact of dollarisation on banking fragility similarly reveal mixed 
evidence.  Arteta (2003) investigates the impact of deposit and credit dollarisation for a large 
number of developing and transition countries and finds no evidence that dollarisation 
increases fragility. De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003) perform a similar test, but measure 
fragility using average Z-scores (measuring the distance to default for the banking system, 
which is different from the actual occurrence of a systemic crisis) and non-performing loans 
across a large number of countries.  In contrast to Arteta’s results, they find that dollarisation 
is positively related to both measures of bank fragility. 
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Bank ownership and structure and crises   
The nature of bank ownership, whether private or public, domestic or foreign, has been found 
to have a strong association with various aspects of bank performance. Does the likelihood of 
a systemic banking crisis also depend on who owns the banks? 
State ownership of banks, although declining, continues to be popular in many 
countries, despite widespread evidence of political abuse and governance problems in state-
owned institutions (World Bank, 2001). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) find that greater state ownership in banking is associated 
with reduced competition, poorer productivity and lower growth. Concerning systemic crises, 
Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) show that greater state ownership at the beginning of the 
1980s is associated with a greater probability of a banking crisis during 1980–97. Using 
simple cross-sectional regressions, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) confirm this finding.   
Whether developing countries should welcome foreign ownership of banks is also a 
highly disputed issue, particularly as the share of banking assets controlled by foreign banks 
soared in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in recent years (World Bank, 2001). 
Empirical studies have shown that by improving overall operating efficiency, foreign entry 
helps create the conditions for improved financial intermediation and long-term growth 
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). 
On systemic fragility, one concern is that foreign banks may not have a lower long-
term commitment to the host country and might flee at the first signs of trouble. Even worse, 
they may introduce a new source of contagion by withdrawing from the host country when 
conditions in their home country deteriorate. Existing empirical evidence does not support 
these concerns.  Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) find that the presence of foreign 
banks is associated with a lower risk of banking crisis. Dages et al. (2000) find that foreign 
banks operating in Argentina and Mexico had stronger and less volatile loan growth than   19
domestic banks during and after the Tequila Crisis (1994–9). Peek and Rosengren (2000) 
reach a similar conclusion for both direct (or cross-border) lending and local lending by 
foreign banks in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico from 1994 to 1999. In Malaysia, Detragiache 
and Gupta (2004) show that foreign banks performed better during the crisis, but only those 
from outside the region, while foreign banks with an Asian focus did not perform 
significantly better than domestic banks.  
Another reason for concern related to foreign entry is its impact on fragility via 
competition.  Foreign entry might increase competition, which will likely improve bank 
efficiency, but more competition may destabilise the banking system. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2004) study the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national 
institutions on the likelihood of experiencing a systemic banking crisis. They find that 
banking crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems, fewer 
regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and national institutions that 
encourage competition. Thus, there is no evidence that greater competition is damaging to 
stability.
12
  While concentration is also associated with lower bank fragility, this result likely 
reflects better risk diversification by larger banks in more concentrated systems rather than 
less competition.      
 
The role of institutions 
The role of institutions in affecting bank fragility has been investigated extensively. In 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), we proxy institutional development by GDP per 
capita and an index of law and order, and show that weaker institutional environments are 
related to higher probability of banking crises. Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) consider the 
effects of transparency on banking crises in financially liberalised markets. They find that   20
countries with low transparency (or high corruption) are more likely to experience banking 
crises as a result of financial liberalisation.   
Another important characteristic of the institutional environment is the presence of an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme. While explicit deposit insurance should reduce bank 
fragility by eliminating the possibility of self-fulfilling panics, it is also well-known that it 
may create incentives for excessive risk-taking (Kane, 1989). In Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), we find that explicit deposit insurance is associated with a higher 
probability of banking crisis in a large sample of countries, the more so if bank interest rates 
are deregulated and if the institutional environment is weak. These results support the 
arguments that moral hazard is a greater problem in liberalised financial systems where 
greater risk-taking opportunities are available, and in countries with weaker institutions, 
where it is more difficult to monitor and curb the excess risk-taking by banks.  Furthermore, 
the impact of deposit insurance on bank fragility varies with design of the system, i.e., it is 
possible to curb moral hazard with better design. Features such as lower coverage, co-
insurance, private sector involvement in the management of the scheme, ex-post funding, and 
mandatory membership are associated with lower levels of bank fragility. 
Other studies explore this issue further. Arteta and Eichengreen (2002) find these 
results to be less robust, but they look at a sub-sample including only developing countries 
and ignore differences in deposit insurance design. Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) investigate 
how the decision to introduce deposit insurance affects the volatility of  financial 
development indicators, such as credit to the private sector as a share of GDP and the ratio of 
M3 to GDP. They find that explicit deposit insurance increases volatility in countries with 
weak institutional development. In a related paper, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) use 
bank-level data to study how deposit insurance affects market discipline of banks. Focusing 
on the disciplinary role of interest rates and deposit growth, they find that market discipline is   21
stronger in countries with better institutions, but generously designed deposit insurance can 
still curtail it, resulting in fragility.  
The issue of how bank regulation and supervision affects banking crises is very 
important,  since ensuring bank safety and soundness is a major goal of  bank regulators. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), having developed a comprehensive survey database on 
measures of regulation and supervision, are able to investigate this issue empirically for the 
first time. Their results indicate that regulatory and supervisory practices that force accurate 
information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for 
private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank performance and 
stability. In a cross-country setting they show that regulatory and supervisory regimes with 
these features have suffered fewer crises in the past two decades. Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2004) also confirm that poorly designed explicit deposit insurance leads to greater 




The political system and crises   
Political considerations may play a very important role in government decisions to deal with 
insolvent institutions. Based on a rigorous examination of the US Savings and Loan crisis, 
Kroszner (1997) argues that disseminating information about the costs of inefficient 
government policy, ensuring competition among interest groups, increasing the transparency 
of government decisions, improving the structure of legislative oversight of the regulatory 
process, and allowing entry of foreign banks are all measures that can potentially improve 
government financial sector policy and reduce the cost of crises. These recommendations 
place great importance on the disciplining role of information and the existence of 
competitive elections. 
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Brown and Dinc (2004) use data on individual bank failures in developing countries 
to investigate the impact of political factors on bank fragility. They find that political 
concerns play a significant role in delaying government intervention in failing banks. For 
instance, failing banks are less likely to be taken over by the Government or lose their 
licenses before elections than after elections. This effect becomes even stronger when the 
ruling party is politically weak. 
This brief summary of the recent additions to the bank crisis literature reveals that 
there has been significant interest in how institutions – economic, financial or political – 
affect bank fragility.  Another broad area of focus has been the impact of the policy 
framework – financial liberalisation, exchange rate regime, policy on foreign bank entry – on 
bank stability. Most of the research on these themes uses the multivariate probability model 
and low frequency data, since institutional and structural variables change slowly over time. 
Because of this literature, we now know much more and will no doubt continue to learn more 
about the fundamental reasons underlying financial crises. But what are the economic 
consequences of banking crises? We turn to this question next.  
 
6.  The effects of banking crises 
The credit crunch hypothesis 
A number of empirical studies of banking crises examine not only what causes crises but also 
how crises affect the rest of the economy. For example, summarising several case studies, 
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) conclude that bank fragility has adversely affected 
economic growth. More systematic empirical investigations have also shown that output 
growth and private credit growth drop significantly below normal in the years around 
banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., forthcoming).    23
 
Measures of output loss relative to trend during financial crises have been used to 
compare the severity of these events. For instance, Bordo et al. (2001) show that financial 
crises (currency crises, banking crises, or both) entailed similar-sized output losses in recent 
years as compared to previous historical periods. Crises, however, are more frequent now 
than during the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods periods, and are as frequent now as in the 
interwar years. Hoggarth et al. (2002) make the point that output losses associated with 
banking crises are not more severe in developing countries than in developed countries. 
An obvious question raised by these studies is whether causality goes from output 
losses to banking crises or the other way around. The answer has obvious policy 
implications: if crises indeed have real costs, then the case for generous bank rescue 
operations is strengthened, even though these policies have large fiscal costs and adverse 
incentive effects ex ante. Conversely, if the output slowdown is mainly the result of 
exogenous shocks, then bailouts might not be beneficial. Sorting out causality, however, is a 
challenging task.  
As the literature surveyed in the preceding section shows, crises are accompanied by 
worsening macroeconomic performance triggered by adverse shocks, such as a tightening of 
monetary policy, the end of a credit boom, or a sudden stop in foreign capital inflows. A 
distressed banking sector, in turn, may be a serious obstacle to economic activity and 
aggravate the effect of adverse shocks. For instance, when banks are distressed, firms may be 
unable to obtain credit to deal with a period of low internal cash flow. In fact, lack of credit 
may force viable firms into bankruptcy. Similarly, lack of consumer credit may worsen 
declines in consumption and aggregate demand during a recession, aggravating 
unemployment. In extreme cases, bank runs and bank failures can threaten the soundness of   24
the payment system, making transactions more difficult and expensive. These mechanisms 
suggest that fragile banks hinder economic activity (the credit crunch hypothesis). 
On the other hand, there are several channels through which exogenous adverse 
shocks to the economy might cause a decline in credit and economic activity even if the 
banking sector itself is relatively healthy. For instance, adverse shocks may trigger a fall in 
aggregate demand, leading firms to cut production and investment and, consequently, credit 
demand. Increased uncertainty may also cause firms to delay investment and borrowing 
decisions. Finally, adverse shocks might worsen agency problems and complicate lending 
relationships, for instance by reducing the net worth of borrowers. This, in turn, might cause 
banks to abandon high risk borrowers (flight to quality) or raise lending spreads. So output 
and bank credit may decelerate around banking crises even if there is no feedback effect from 
bank distress to credit availability.
14
  
Existing studies of individual country experiences have found conflicting evidence on 
the relationship between bank distress and real activity. In a study of the so-called capital 
crunch in the United States in 1990, Bernanke et al. (1991) argue that a shortage of bank 
capital had little to do with the recession. Domaç and Ferri (1999) reached the opposite 
conclusion for Malaysia and Korea during 1997–8. They found small and medium-sized 
firms to have suffered more than large firms during the crisis. Since these firms are usually 
more dependent on bank credit than large firms, this is evidence of a credit crunch. Data from 
a survey of Thai firms, on the other hand, suggest that poor demand rather than lack of credit 
caused the decline in production, although many firms complained about high interest rates 
(Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000). For Indonesia and Korea, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) 
test an aggregate model of credit demand and supply and find evidence of a credit crunch, 
but only in the first few months of the crisis. Finally, using firm level data from Korea, 
Borensztein and Lee (2002) show that firms belonging to industrial groups (chaebols) lost   25
their preferential access to credit during the banking crisis, although this was not necessarily 
evidence of a credit crunch.  
New evidence on the credit crunch hypothesis comes from a recent study by 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2005). To identify the real effects of banking crises, this paper follows the 
‘difference-in-difference’ approach adopted by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to study the 
effects of finance on growth. Using a panel of countries and industry-level data, the authors 
test whether more financially dependent sectors perform significantly worse during banking 
crises, after controlling for all possible time-specific, country-specific, and industry-specific 
shocks that may affect firm performance. The main result is that indeed more financially 
dependent sectors suffer more during crises, evidence in favor of the credit crunch 
hypothesis. The results are robust to controlling for other possible explanations, such as 
flight-to-quality during recessions, the effects of concomitant currency crises, and the 
exposure of bank portfolios to specific bank-dependent industries. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the effect is non-trivial: more financially dependent sectors lose about 1 
percentage point of growth in each crisis year compared to less financially dependent sectors. 
Finally, consistent with the theory, the differential effects are stronger in developing 
countries, in countries where the private sector has less access to foreign finance, and where 
the crises are more severe. 
 
Intervention policies and the costs of crises  
A few studies have used cross-country empirical analysis to study which intervention policies 
can minimise the costs of a banking crisis. This question is as important to policymakers as it 
is difficult to answer through empirical analysis. One problem is that compiling accurate 
information on intervention policies for a large enough sample of crises is a laborious task. 
Another difficulty is that the sequence, timing, and specific modalities of a bank support   26
strategy are crucial to the outcome, and it is difficult to capture these complex dimensions 
through quantitative measures of policies.  
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) construct a database with estimates of the fiscal cost 
of 40 banking crises and catalogue the policies adopted in each episode, classified according 
to five broad categories: blanket guarantees to depositors, liquidity support to banks, bank 
recapitalisation, financial assistance to debtors, and forbearance. With this database, the 
authors explore how the different intervention policies affect the fiscal cost of the bailout, 
after controlling for country and crisis characteristics. They conclude that more generous 
bailouts resulted in higher fiscal costs.  
Further evidence on the determinants of the fiscal costs of crises is provided by Keefer 
(2001), who focuses on the political economy of crises resolution. He finds that when voters 
are better informed, elections are close, and the number of veto players is large, governments 
make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are less likely to exercise forbearance 
in dealing with insolvent financial institutions. Thus, transparency, information dissemination, 
and competition among interest groups play an important role is shaping crisis response 
policies. 
The relationship between intervention policies and the economic – rather than fiscal – 
costs of crises is explored by Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003). Costs are measured 
by the output loss relative to trend during the crisis episode. The main finding is that 
generous support to the banking system does not reduce the output cost of banking crises.  
However, since omitted exogenous shocks may simultaneously cause a stronger output 
decline and more generous intervention measures, the interpretation of the results is 
ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the results survive even after the authors control for a large set of 
variables such as GDP growth prior to crisis, existence of deposit insurance, inflation rate at 
the onset of the crisis, state ownership of banks, degree of dollarisation and others.    27
 
7. Conclusions   
Cross-country econometric research on systemic banking crises has progressed 
rapidly in recent years. As a result, we have a better understanding of how systemic bank 
fragility is influenced by a host of factors, ranging from macroeconomic shocks, the structure 
of the banking market, broad institutions, institutions specific to credit markets, and political 
economy variables. Because (fortunately!) banking crises are rare events, existing studies are 
based on a relatively small number of episodes. Going forward, as broader samples become 
available, it will be important to continue to assess the robustness of the conclusions reached 
to date.   
To improve model performance it may also be useful to perfect the definition of a 
banking crisis.  Some crises are the result of long-simmering problems being brought into the 
open, while others are sudden events, triggered by severe exogenous shocks. While the two 
phenomena are certainly related, because they both are rooted in underlying institutional 
weaknesses and may have similar manifestations, distinguishing between these two types of 
crises may help identify clearer and more robust relationships, especially with 
macroeconomic variables.  
As is often the case in economics, empirical models have been more useful in 
identifying factors associated with the occurrence of banking crises than at predicting the 
occurrence of crises out of sample. In part, this reflects the fact that, for the most part, the 
empirical models were not conceived as forecasting tools. Developing useful early warning 
indicators of impeding bank vulnerability will doubtless remain a priority for policymakers, 
and more specific research in this direction would be useful. Work with annual data suggests 
that macroeconomic correlates of crises tend to lose significance if they are lagged by one 
year. This likely indicates that the time it takes for adverse economic shocks to be transmitted   28
to the banking system is quite short. Consequently, the search for useful early warning 
indicators should move towards high frequency data, such as market data. To explore how 
market data performs in crisis prediction, however, requires more work to define and date 
crisis episodes accurately. Future research should proceed in this direction.   
The question of how institutional variables, such as politics and regulation, influence 
bank fragility has been a fruitful area of exploration, and there are several directions in which 
this work can continue. For example, it would be interesting to study how compliance with 
banking regulation and the introduction of the BASEL II capital agreement might affect 
financial stability, particularly in developing countries (see also Goodhart, 2005, this 
volume). Another area of focus has been the impact of policy choices such as liberalisation, 
foreign bank entry, and the resulting market structures on bank fragility. As banking systems 
around the world are being quickly reshaped by globalisation and consolidation,  the study of 
how these trends affect bank fragility will continue to attract attention.   
Finally, the field of banking crises is at the crossroads of open economy 
macroeconomics and the microeconomics of banking and regulation. These two areas of 
research have evolved quite separately in the past, but to understand financial crises insights 
from both fields must be brought together. Exploring more closely how bank level 
information can be incorporated in cross-country empirical models of banking crises would 
be a useful direction for future research.  
 NOTES 
 
1  Among studies of banks and credit during the Great Depression, see for instance Bernanke (1983), Haubrich 
(1990), and Calomiris and Mason (1997). Gorton (1988) uses a sample of banking crises from the US National Banking 
Era (1863-1914) to test whether panics were caused by depositors’ reaction to a forthcoming economic downturn or by 
self-fulfilling beliefs.  
2  Some examples of case studies include Garcia-Herrero (1997), Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998), Jaramillo 
(2000), Gonzáles-Hermosillo et al. (1997), Ramos (1998), and Schumacher (2000). Among papers drawing general 
lessons, see Davis (1995), Gavin and Hausman (1995), Goldstein and Turner (1996), Mishkin (1996), Rojas-Suarez and 
Weisbrod (1995), and Sheng (1995).      
3   The authors use an ‘adjusted’ version of the noise-to-signal ratio, computed as the ratio of the probability of false 
alarms (type II error) to one minus the probability of a missing a crisis (type I error). 
4    As in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), we estimate the model without country fixed effects because we 
want to include non-crisis countries as controls. In the new regressions, however, we allow for the error terms to be 
correlated within each country by clustering the errors by country. In the 1998 paper we just used robust standard 
errors. 
5  Also, including the fiscal deficit in the regressions markedly reduces the number of observations. 
6  See also Bell and Pain (2000) for a recent review of leading indicator models of banking crisis. 
7   CAMEL stands for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity.   
8  Borio and Lowe (2002 and 2005, this volume) also present a model based on the signals approach. In a related 
paper, Boyd, Gomis, Kwak and Smith (2000) focus on the cost of crisis and present a detailed review of macro 
conditions before, during and after crises, for more than 50 crisis countries, basing their discussion on a general 
equilibrium model. They highlight the great diversity of economic conditions that precede crises, drawing the 
conclusion that it is difficult to rule out sunspots, i.e. random events, as the cause of many crises. 
9  Using a variant of the multivariate logit model, in which the crisis dummy takes the value of one in the year 
before the crisis and the value of two in the year of the crisis, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) also find that 
macroeconomic indicators were of limited value in predicting the Asian crises. In none of these countries was the pre-
crisis period identified as problematic. They conclude that the best warning signs for these crises were proxies for the 
vulnerability of the banking and corporate sector.  
10  See Demirgüç-Kunt (1989) for a review of this early literature. 
11  See Eichengreen and Fishlow (1998) for a review of this literature. 
12  This study does not address the question of whether foreign entry leads to a less concentrated banking system, 
however. 
13  It is not possible to control for the quality of regulation and supervision in a panel of data, such as is typically 
used on banking crisis regressions, because measures of these dimensions are only available after 1999.  Results from 
cross-sectional tests show that countries with more generous deposit insurance design are likely to have experienced 
crises since the 1980s, even after controlling for supervision and regulation.       
14  An additional problem is that changes in the aggregate stock of real credit to the private sector are not a good 
measure of the flow of credit available to the economy, especially around banking crises, because of valuation effects 
caused by inflation or exchange rate changes. Also, a decline in the stock of credit may result from restructuring 
operations that transfer non-performing loans to agencies outside the banking system (Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 
forthcoming). 
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Table 1.  Banking Crisis Determinants 
 
 
Multivariate Logit regressions of crisis regressions are estimated updating the analysis in 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). In estimation, errors are clustered by country. The 
period covered is 1980-2002, with 94 countries and up to 77 crisis occurrences in the sample.  
The dependent variable takes the value one for the first year of the crisis and zero otherwise. 
Observations for periods during which the crisis is taking place are excluded from the 
sample. For the crisis episodes for which the crisis duration is unknown, three years after the 
crisis are dropped from the sample. Variable definitions and sources are given in the 
Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GROWTH  -0.0967*** -0.0991*** -0.1115*** -0.1175*** -0.1035*** 
  (0.0259) (0.0265) (0.0319) (0.0332) (0.0274) 
TOTCHANGE  0.0005  0.0006  -0.0024 -0.0028 0.0004 
  (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0065) 
DEPRECIATION  -0.0675 0.0713  -0.1037 -0.1233 0.0490 
  (0.3892) (0.3830) (0.3918) (0.3946) (0.3811) 
RLINTEREST  0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
INFLATION  0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0007***  0.0006** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
RGDP/CAP  -0.0367** -0.0359** -0.0414** -0.0544***  -0.0478*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0178) 
FISCAL BALANCE/GDP    0.0033**  0.0014   
      (0.0016) (0.0020)  
M2/RESERVES    0.0012*  0.0062*** 0.0066*** 0.0013* 
    (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0007) 
PRIVATE/GDP    0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0012*** 0.0010*** 
    (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
CREDITGROt-2    0.0038**  0.0044* 0.0041* 0.0035* 
    (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
DEPOSITINS     0.5859**  0.5131** 
     (0.2786)  (0.2582) 
No.  of  crises  77 75 65 65 75 
Observations  1670 1612 1356 1356 1612 
%  total  correct 67 70 70 68 68 
%  crises  correct  60 60 58 62 61 
%  no-crises  correct  67 70 70 68 69 
Pseudo-R2  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 
Chi-sq  216.07*** 230.12*** 307.22*** 348.28*** 248.72*** 
AIC  593 579 494 493 579 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   37
 
Table II. Banking Crises Dates and Durations by Country 
 
  Country  Crisis Episodes 1980-2002 
  Algeria 1990-1992 
  Argentina  1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995, 2001-2002* 
  Benin 1988-1990 
  Bolivia   1986-1988, 1994-1997**, 2001-2002* 
  Brazil 1990,  1994-1999 
  Burkina Faso  1988-1994 
  Burundi 1994-1997** 
  Cameroon 1987-1993,  1995-1998 
  Central African Republic  1988-1999 
  Chad 1992 
  Chile 1981-1987 
  Colombia 1982-1985,  1999-2000 
  Congo, Rep.  1992-2002* 
  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1994-2002* 
  Costa Rica   1994-1997** 
  Cote d'Ivoire   1988-1991 
  Ecuador 1995-2002* 
  El Salvador  1989 
  Finland 1991-1994 
  Ghana 1982-1989,  1997-2002* 
  Guinea 1985,  1993-1994 
  Guinea-Bissau 1994-1997** 
  Guyana 1993-1995 
  India 1991-1994** 
  Indonesia 1992-1995**,  1997-2002* 
  Israel 1983-1984 
  Italy 1990-1995 
  Jamaica 1996-2000 
  Japan 1992-2002* 
  Jordan 1989-1990 
  Kenya 1993-1995 
  Korea 1997-2002 
  Lebanon 1988-1990 
  Liberia 1991-1995 
  Madagascar 1988-1991** 
  Malaysia 1985-1988,  1997-2001 
  Mali 1987-1989 
  Mauritania 1984-1993 
  Mexico 1982,  1994-1997 
  Nepal 1988-1991** 
  Níger 1983-1986** 
  Nigeria 1991-1995 
  Norway 1987-1993 
  Panama 1988-1989 
  Papua New Guinea  1989-1992** 
  Paraguay 1995-1999   38
  Country  Crisis Episodes 1980-2002 
  Peru 1983-1990 
  Philippines 1981-1987,  1998-2002* 
  Portugal 1986-1989 
  Senegal 1983-1988 
  Sierra Leone  1990-1993** 
  South Africa  1985 
  Sri Lanka  1989-1993 
  Swaziland 1995 
  Sweden 1990-1993 
  Taiwan 1997-1998 
  Tanzania 1988-1991** 
  Thailand 1983-1987,  1997-2002* 
  Tunisia 1991-1995 
  Turkey 1982,  1991,  1994,  2000-2002* 
  Uganda 1994-1997** 
  United States  1980-1992 
  Uruguay 1981-1985,  2002* 
  Venezuela 1993-1997 
  Notes: 
*The crisis is still ongoing as of 2005. 
**The end date for the crisis is not certain, a four-year duration is assumed. 
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Table III. Estimated Crisis Probabilities – Actual vs. Forecast Data 
 
 
Estimated crisis probabilities are as given in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000).  They 
define four fragility zones, increasing in the level of fragility, based on type I and type II 
errors.  The probability intervals for each zone are: Zone I, 0.000-0.018; Zone II, 0.018-
0.036; Zone III, 0.036-0.070; Zone IV, 0.070-1.000.  
 
Banking crisis  Estimated Crisis Probabilities   
  Based on Actual Data  Based on Forecast Data 
Jamaica (1996)  11.0  6.0 
Indonesia (1997)  14.4  2.4 
Korea (1997)  4.4  2.3 
Malaysia (1997)  3.7  1.8 
Philippines (1997)  5.9  3.5 





VARIABLE NAME D EFINITION S OURCE  
BANKING CRISIS  Dummy variable that equals one if there is 
a banking crisis and zero otherwise. 
1998 list updated by the authors 
using Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) 
and IMF country reports. 
GROWTH  Rate of growth of real GDP  WDI 
TOT CHANGE  Change in the terms of trade  WDI 
REAL INTEREST  Nominal interest rate minus the 
contemporaneous rate of inflation  
IFS: Nominal interest rate is the 
treasury bill rate (line 60c), or if not 
available is the discount/bank rate 
(line 60), or if not available is the 
deposit rate (line 60l)  
WDI: (GDP Deflator Based) 
inflation rate  
INFLATION  Rate of change of GDP deflator  WDI 
FISCAL 
BALANCE/GDP 
Budget surplus scaled by GDP  The variable is IFS Line 80, Govt 
finance:deficit (-) or surplus (+) (loc 
currency) divided by GDP (loc. cur., 
WDI). 
M2/RESERVES  Ratio of M2 to international reserves  IFS: M2 is money plus quasi money 
(Current LCU, lines 34+35) which 
is converted to US$ and divided by 
total foreign exchange reserves of 
the central bank (US$)  
DEPRECIATION  Rate of depreciation  IFS: Dollar/local currency exchange 
rate (line ae)  
CREDIT GROWTH  Rate of growth of real domestic credit to 
the private sector  
Growth in IFS line 32d divided by 
the GDP deflator (WDI)  
PRIVATE/GDP  Ratio of private credit to GDP  Domestic credit to the private sector 
(IFS line 32d) divided by GDP 
(WDI) (all in local currency) 
GDP/CAP  Real GDP per capita   WDI: constant 1995 in thousands of 
US$  
DEPOSITINS  Dummy that equals one if the country has 
explicit deposit insurance (including 
blanket guarantees) and zero otherwise for 
the given year. 
Updated Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) figures using 
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 
(2004) 
 